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Abstract
Gatekeepers have an increasing role in taxation and regulation. While burdening
them with legal liability for misconducts that benet those who resort to their services
actually discourages wrongdoings as will be claried in the paper an alienation e¤ect
can also arise. That is, the gatekeeper might become more interested in covering up
the illegal behavior and in cooperating with the perpetrator. Such perverse e¤ects are
di¢ cult to detect and to measure. This paper studies the problem with respect to tax
evasion by rms, by building upon the classical Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model and
by providing a more detailed description of the concealment costs than that available
in the literature, which often simply makes assumptions about their existence and their
functional form. The relationship between a risk neutral rm owner aiming at evading
taxes and a risk averse gatekeeper is described through a simple principal-agent framework.
The paper highlights the role of legal rules pertaining to liability for tax evasion in shaping
the parties choices, since concealment costs vary according to whether the risk neutral
principal or the risk averse agent are held responsible when tax evasion is detected. The
main result of the analysis is that there is a simple ex post test that can be run to infer
whether harnessing the agent was socially benecial.
Keywords: tax evasion, rm, agency, risk aversion
JEL classication: H26, H32, D81, K42
1 Introduction
There is by now a large positive and normative literature available on tax evasion  dealt
at the levels of either individuals or rms.1 But not too many papers deal with the role of
gatekeepers,2 like a lawyer or a tax manager, without whose presence and active support, it
may not be possible to evade tax, whatever the underlying causes are. Sometimes this set-up
may have been structurally determined. For instance, in big corporate structures, tax related
activities are coordinated by the chief nancial o¢ cer rather than the shareholders. Since
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1For an assessment by a founder of this stream of literature, see Sandmo (2005).
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relative e¢ cacies of tax enforcement on the latter (i.e., the principal) and the former (i.e.,
the agent) can have very di¤erent policy implications, it is important to view tax evasion,
particularly by rms, within a principal-agent framework. Apart from the two studies that we
mention shortly, to our knowledge no other paper in this area dealt with the issue of tax evasion
by the rm within a principal-agent framework. In general, the literature on tax evasion by
rms3 preoccupies itself with the two choices of evasion and output, given the tax rate and
probability of detection. There is a concealment cost associated with concealment technology
when the rm is either risk-neutral or risk-averse. Even when the existing models do not
operate under a principal-agent structure, in case of rmstax evasion they internalize a costly
concealment technology, which, however, is not specically described. In agency models a
signicant concealment cost can instead be studied, since one can focus upon the compensation
and the incentives needed for securing the cooperation of tax o¢ cers, employees, consultants,
experts etc. An important role that these subjects can play, in exchange for remuneration, is
that of exerting e¤ort in order to hide the illegal aspects of the conduct and thus to reduce
the probability of audit. This can be done, e.g., by suitably blurring the signals of misconduct
that usually trigger the intervention of the tax o¢ cials, thus helping the entrepreneur avoid the
more standard hiding techniques and design new avoidance schemes.
The agency problem of the evading rm has been studied by Chen and Chu (2005) and
Crocker and Slemrod (2005). Both papers focus on problems of asymmetry of information.
Chen and Chu (2005) consider the relationship between the rms owner and a risk-averse
agent who is hired for productive purposes. The rms prot stochastically depends on the
agents productive e¤ort. If only the risk neutral principal is legally liable, no e¢ ciency problem
arises since the evasion risk is allocated to the party more able to bear it and the principals
choice about evasion is separable from the problem of designing the incentives for the agent.
If, however, also the agent is liable, the principal must pay her a risk premium ex ante, since
insuring the agent against sanctions is not legally permissible. Thus the agents salary can
di¤er from the one needed to provide the proper incentives for production, and a loss of control
on the agent might arise.
Crocker and Slemrod (2005) assume that shareholders (the principal) contact with the vice-
president or chief nancial o¢ cer (the agent) to whom the decision about the rms tax report
is delegated. Both the principal and the agent are risk neutral. Only the manager knows the
extent of legally permissible rules, and thus there is an information asymmetry between the
parties. In the paper they characterize the optimal compensation contract for the tax manager
and nd out the response to changed enforcement policies. It turns out that sanctioning the
agent is more e¤ective than sanctioning the principal, since in the latter case the e¤ect is only
indirect through contractual incentives upon the agent and is weakened by the second best
nature of the agency contract. A further result is that the agents marginal compensation is
increasing in her liability, since the principal aims at neutralizing the e¤ect of sanctions upon
the revelation of information possessed by the agent.
A second stream of literature to which this paper aims at contributing is that on self-
protection (the terminology was invented by Ehrlich and Becker, 1972), i.e., an activity that
reduces the probability of occurrence of a bad outcome at a given cost (Sévi and Yal, 2005).
The e¤ort performed by the agent in the model presented in this paper is actually aimed at
producing self-protection.4 It is now well-established that an increase in risk-aversion does
3For a survey, see Cowell (2004).
4As long as the agent is liable she protects herself. Also with reference to the liable principal one may speak
of self-protection since the principal expends resources to pay the agent in order to reduce the probability of
the bad outcome.
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not necessarily lead to higher self-protection expenditures (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972, Sweeney
and Beard, 1992, and Chiu, 2000). This is so because, as observed by Briys and Schlesinger
(1990), expenditure on self-protection reduces the income in all states and therefore does not
necessarily lead to less risky income prospects. Therefore, the attitude towards self- protection
di¤ers from the attitude towards self-insurance and market insurance in signicant ways.
An agency model with self-protection has been studied by Privileggi et Al. (2001), who
consider an (all or nothing) illegal activity that benets the principal. The agent exerts e¤ort
in order to hide the wrongdoing and is risk-averse; the principal is risk-neutral. The main
nding of the paper is that shifting the full liability upon the agent reduces the principals
prot. However, the agents e¤ort can either decrease or increase, and thus unwanted e¤ects
upon deterrence can arise. The resort to self-protection - in addition to self-insurance - by an
individual evading taxpayer has also been studied by Lee (2001), who nds that - unlike in the
standard model - under given assumptions the reported income is decreasing in the tax rate.
In this paper we present a principal agent model in which an agent is hired by an entrepre-
neur to exert e¤ort in covering tax evasion. We study many regimes of legal liability for taxes
and sanctions, that span from a full liability on the part of the principal to full liability on part
of the agent including the intermediate cases of shared liability. While it is assumed that tax
evasion always benets the principal, the moral justications for considering agents liability 
which actually is often provided to some extent by the law might hinge upon the fact that
the agent has a deep knowledge of the unlawful character of the conduct,5 or is expected to
follow strict deontological rules. Moreover, the agent might even have a deeper pocket than the
principal, as sometimes happens for consultants with respect to small businesses.
When liability is shifted, either fully or partially, from the principal to the agent evasion
becomes more costly, since the agents cooperation must be paid. However, the agent might be
pushed to exert a higher e¤ort in covering it and thus the likelihood of discovering the evasion
might decrease. Hence there is a problem of excessive loyaltyof the agent with respect to the
principal, often discussed in the psychological literature, e.g., with respect to soldiers obeying
orders that violate international conventions and human rights. While the economic literature
on agency has mainly focussed on the opposite problem i.e., the agents opportunistic behavior
in a more general perspective it is interesting also to apply the economic analysis to the non-
optimal loyalty problem in all its forms (see, e.g., Morck, 2009).
In the following it will be assumed as usual that the principal is risk neutral while the agent
is risk-averse. Moreover, the principal cannot pursue her evasion design without securing the
agents cooperation, either for technical or legal reasons, since, e.g., only the agent possesses
the needed expertise or has the signatory authority for the needed documents. As long as only
the principal is legally liable for tax evasion, an amoral agent can consider the cooperation in
covering up as a kind of work without risk and thus accept a compensation just corresponding
to her reservation utility. On the other hand, if the legal liability is shifted upon the risk-averse
agent, things are clearly di¤erent. The agent is exposed to the risk of sanctions, at least as
long as the principal cannot provide her an insurance. Since insurance against sanctions for
illegal activities are often prohibited by the law, it will be assumed that the principal can
neither insure the agent nor make the agents remuneration conditional on the nal result of
the evasion.
A problem that arises when the agent is liable for sanctions is that the contract with the
5Gatekeepers liability in general can also refer to other cases not studied here in which the agent is not
actively cooperating with the wrongdoer and might have imperfect information about the principals conduct,
but nevertheless can contribute to some extent at enforcing the law. For this broader perspective, see, e.g.,
Hamdani (2003).
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principal has an illicit content and thus is not legally enforceable. If, however, the parties have a
long lasting relationship it seems plausible that they can trust each other and can conclude and
honor a contract in which the agent performs the e¤ort in covering up and the principal pays a
remuneration that includes ex ante a premium for the risk.6 Trust might be based on repeated
interactions, that would arise if, e.g., the agent is an employee or a consultant with a strong
link with the enterprise (and thus the contract under consideration is a side one). Moreover, it
is more likely if the principal knows the agents preferences and can observe the agents e¤ort.
It is interesting now to note how full information plays a crucial role in the model that we
set up in this context. Trust is less plausible if information is imperfect. This assumption of
perfect information will be maintained throughout the whole paper. As will become clear in
the following, non trivial problems arise even if full information is considered.
In this paper we bridge some gaps in the previous literature, on the one hand by focussing
on the specic contribution to tax evasion provided by agents (as in Crocker and Slemrod, 2005,
and Privileggi et Al., 2001), while at the same time allowing for di¤erent attitudes toward risk
of the parties (as in Chen and Chu, 2005), and including a full description of the rms tax
evasion problem, in which evasion is a continuous variable (while the wrongdoings benet was
discrete in Privileggi et Al., 2001). Our structure that considers three variables (evasion, agents
remuneration and e¤ort) gives su¢ cient complexity to the model and allows us to study the
tax evasion choice without unnecessarily strong restrictions on risk preferences of the parties
involved.
Our results provide relevant indications about the relationship between the agents remu-
neration and the legal incentives in a risky environment. While the standard hint coming from
the available literature is that the agents remuneration is increasing in her liability [see, e.g.,
Hamdani (2003), and, with reference to marginal bonuses, Crocker and Slemrod (2005)], we
show that there are cases in which her compensation decreases in response to an expansion of
her liability.
Another important e¤ect of a full or partial shift of liability from the principal to the agent
is the decrease of the principals prot. Hence, the attractiveness of evasion decreases. The
check on the principals evasion arises because in such a framework the risk-averse agent must
be exposed to a risk. But the benecial e¤ects on enforcement of the liability shift can be
reduced or even overturned if the agent becomes more loyal, i.e., chooses to work harder in
order to increase the likelihood of escaping the punishment. However, also in our setting 
which modies the standard self-protection problem by introducing an agency relationship in
which e¤ort is performed it is conrmed that the agents risk-aversion does not necessarily
imply a larger self-protection demand. We are in fact able at detecting a case in which after a
liability shift no ambiguity is left and a favorable scenario from the social point of view arises.
As long as the check introduced by the agents liability involves huge costs for the principal
and huge risks for the agent, they might prefer to boldly cut their misconduct. It is thus
possible that, when liability is shifted totally or partially upon the agent, a smaller level
of both tax evasion and e¤ort is chosen, and the agent compensation decreases. Therefore, our
main result is that whenever ex post it is observed that the remuneration is (weakly) lower
in the agents liability (full or partial) than in the principals, then both evasion and e¤ort
under the former have to be lower. Hence, there is a simple ex post test that can be run to
ascertain the e¤ectiveness of a reform that harnesses gatekeepers with more legal liability. If a
fall of their income arises, the reform is working in the right direction. Since information about
6Trust arising from repeated interactions might also in some cases render a de facto insurance of the agent
viable. For a discussion of this possibility, and of the reasons by which it seems unlikely, see p. 161 in Chen
and Chu (2005).
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compensations and incomes can be provided by standard statistical data sources, one may run
a kind of ex post test about the e¤ectiveness of the liability shift.7
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, some alternative liability regimes are pre-
sented and their implications in terms of tax evasion and probability of detection are studied.
Section 3 compares them and reports our main results in terms of policy implications. In Section
4 some numeric examples are discussed. Section 5 concludes, while all technicalities regarding
the non-trivial constrained maximization techniques used in the text and the computation of
the numeric examples are postponed in the Appendix.
2 The liability regimes
Liability for tax evasion can be placed by the legal system either only upon the principal or
only upon the agent, or it might be shared among the two. The rst case often occurs in
practice, since tax evasion directly benets the principal. Situations in which only the agent is
liable seems rare in practice: nevertheless they are interesting as a limit case with respect to
the shared liability. Note also that, as long as sanctions for tax evasion are a multiple of the
due tax (See Yitzhaki, 1987), when liability for sanctions is fully transferred upon the agent
the principal still bears some risk, as she must pay the due tax in case of audit.8 For a clearer
understanding of the e¤ects of di¤erent liability regimes, we will thus explore also a further
limit case, the one in which the whole risk is shifted upon the agent i.e., in case of detection
the agent is held responsible for both the due tax and the sanction.9
In practice, however, intermediate cases prevail; that is, while the principal is held liable
for tax evasion, additional specic responsibilities are also provided for the agent. This cases
will be modelled, for the sake of simplicity, as a form of shared liability, since whenever the
evasion is found out the whole sanctions applied can be seen as a total that is divided between
the parties according to the rules designed for each of them.
Summing up, to ease the analysis, the cases described above are packed into three alternative
legal regimes characterized as follows: i) only the principal is liable for both the due tax and
the sanction (see Subsection 2.1); ii) the whole risk (both for the due tax and sanctions) is
shifted upon the agent (see Subsection 2.2); iii) the principal is liable for the due tax but her
liability for sanctions is limited to a share 0   < 1, while the agent bears the remaining part.
This case (see Subsection 2.3) thus includes a full shift of the liability for sanctions (but not
for the due tax) on the agent, which occurs when  = 0.
2.1 Only the principal is liable
Let us consider the case in which the principal is legally liable for tax evasion if an audit occurs,
while the agent is not.
The principals expected net benet is given by
E (x; r; E) = [1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   r; (1)
where p : R+ ! [0; 1] denotes the probability of audit, x is the agents e¤ort in covering up,
s > 0 is the sanction rate, 0 < t < 1 is the tax rate, E is the evaded amount, and r is the
7Of course this is a ceteris paribus prediction and thus other factors that might explain income changes
should be controlled for.
8The standard simplifying assumptions that audits perfectly reveal evasion is maintained in the paper.
9This full shift of the risk of tax evasion is more easy to conceive when sanctions are upon the evaded income,
as in the original Alligham and Sandmo (1972) model. The results of this paper carry over to such a case.
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agents remuneration. It is also assumed that
[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   r > 0: (2)
In other words, evasion implies a positive expected return (otherwise the principal chooses not
to undertake any illegal action). Joint with the assumption that r  0, (2) immediately implies
that E > 0 must hold and feasible values of e¤ort x must satisfy 1  p (x) (1 + s) > 0.
The principal wants to maximize (1) with respect to the three variables x, r and E, subject
to two constraints plus non-negativity of variables; that is, the principals problem is:
max f[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   rg
s.t.

u (r)  g (x)  u0;
E  Y; x  0; r  0: (3)
In (3), u : R ! R is the agents utility function, u0 is her reservation utility, g : R+ ! R+
denotes the cost of e¤ort x borne by the agent, while Y > 0 denotes the principals income. Y
is assumed to be exogenous.10 The rst constraint allows for agents participation.
A. 1 In the following we shall assume:
i) u0 (w) > 0 and u00 (w) < 0, for all w 2 R,
ii) 0 < p (x) < 1, p0 (x) < 0 and p00 (x) > 0 for all x  0,
iii) g0 (x) > 0 and g00 (x)  0 for all x > 0,
iv) u (0)  u0, g (0) = 0, g0+ (0) = 0.
Assumption A.1(iv) is a technical condition which, joint with inequality (2), is su¢ cient to
rule out corner solutions in problem (3).11
Necessary K.T. conditions12 yield the following characterization of the solution (xP ; r

P ; E

P )
for the problem (3) in which only the principal is liable:
EP = Y; (4)
u (rP )  g (xP ) = u0; (5)
 p0 (xP ) (1 + s) tY =
g0 (xP )
u0 (rP )
: (6)
Note that Assumptions A.1(i) and (iii) imply that the constraint dened by the four inequalities
in (3) is convex; in addition, necessary condition (4) says that the maximization in (3) is actually
performed only with respect to the two variables x and r, for which the objective function turns
out to be concave. This is su¢ cient to establish uniqueness of the solution (xP ; r

P ; E

P ).
Condition (4) states that, at the optimum, the whole income Y will be hidden, while con-
ditions (5) and (6) say respectively that the agent must receive her reservation utility13 and
that the marginal benet of e¤ort for the principal, in terms of reduction of the expected loss,
 p0 (xP ) (1 + s) tY , must equal the marginal rate of substitution between e¤ort and compen-
sation, g0 (xP ) =u
0 (rP ), for the agent.
10In order to ensure that the agent has a pocket deep enough for sustaining her liability, one might assume
that she too has an exogenous income coming, e.g., from a legal activity. Since the inclusion of such constant
term is immaterial with respect to our theoretical results, for simplicity we have dropped it.
11Actually, Assumption A.1(iv) is not necessary and in specic examples the condition that g0+ (0) = 0 may
be dropped while interiority of solution can be obtained directly through a suitable choice of parametersvalues.
12From the K.T. conditions it is easily seen that the rst two inequalities in the constraint must be binding.
13The agent that cooperates in tax cheating might threaten the principal of disclosing the wrongdoing, and
demand more than her reservation utility. We assume that the trust relationship between the parties is strong
enough to exclude this possibility.
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2.2 The agent bears all the risks
In order to reach a better understanding of the case in which liability involves the agent, let
us begin by considering an extreme case, in which the whole risk is shifted upon her; i.e., if an
audit occurs, the agent bears all the consequences of tax evasion, and thus she has to pay the
due tax plus the sanction on top of it.
The principals problem becomes:
max (tE   r)
s.t.

[1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1 + s) tE]  g (x)  u0;
E  Y; x  0; r  0: (7)
Again, to ensure that the principal gets a positive return,
tE   r > 0 (8)
must hold, which, as r  0, implies that E > 0 holds true.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption A.1 and (8), the following conditions necessarily hold:
r > p (x) (1 + s) tE for all x  0 and E  Y (9)
1  p (x) (1 + s) > 0 for all x  0: (10)
Proof. To establish (9) assume the contrary: r  p (x) (1 + s) tE. Hence,
[1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1 + s) tE]  g (x) < u [r   p (x) (1 + s) tE]  g (x)
 u (0)  g (x)
 u0;
where the rst inequality follows from strict concavity of u (), the second inequality from
monotonicity of u () joint with the contradiction r  p (x) (1 + s) tE and the last inequality
from Assumptions A.1 (iii) and (iv). Therefore, the agents participation constraint the rst
inequality in (7) implies (9).
By (8),
tE   p (x) (1 + s) tE = tE [1  p (x) (1 + s)] > tE   r > 0;
which implies (10).
Note that E > 0 in (9) implies r > 0.
Proposition 1 shows that in order to have a viable problem the risk-averse agent must receive
a salary larger than her expected liability, while evasion must have an overall positive expected
return.
As the principals objective function is linear, convexity of the constraint is enough in order
to have a concave problem. The agents expected utility,
v (x; r; E) = [1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1 + s) tE]  g (x) ;
is concave in each relevant variable, E, r and x, taken alone, but concavity jointly in all three
variables could lack because of cross-e¤ects. In Appendix 6.A su¢ cient conditions for assur-
ing quasiconcavity of v and thus convexity of the constraint are put forth and discussed.
Essentially, convexity of the constraint in problem (7) implies that for every given evasion and
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e¤ort combination, there is just one compensation r representing the minimal cost the principal
has to bear for implementing such combination without violating the agents participation con-
straint. Large families of functions, such as HARA (Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion) utility
functions, hyperbolic probability functions and quadratic e¤ort cost, satisfy these conditions.
From the K.T. conditions applied to (7) under Assumption A.1 it is straightforward to
show that at the optimum, besides EA > 0 and r

A > 0, x

A > 0 holds as well, while the rst
inequality once again is binding. The following characterization of the solution (xA; r

A; E

A) for
the problem (7) in which only the agent is fully liable arises:
[1  p (xA)]u (rA) + p (xA)u [rA   (1 + s) tEA]  g (xA) = u0; (11)
 p0 (xA) fu (rA)  u [rA   (1 + s) tEA]g = g0 (xA) (12)
[1  p (xA)]u0 (rA)
p (xA)u0 [r

A   (1 + s) tEA]
 s: (13)
Inequality (13), pertaining to the choice of the evasion amount, is the standard condition
found in models of tax evasion, in which a risk-averse decision maker is considered. This is no
surprise, since in a framework of full information the principal might also solve her problem
by letting the agent to become the residual claimant with respect to the evasion activity. The
agent would receive all the benets and bear all the costs, while just paying a xed fee to
the principal. Under this alternative formulation the principals role would just be that of
choosing the largest fee compatible with the agents participation constraint, while the agent
would choose the same e¢ cientEA and x

A values already described. Note that (13) holds as
a strict inequality when the second constraint, E  Y in (7), is binding, i.e., when EA = Y .
As far as the choice of e¤ort is concerned, condition (12) shows that now the relevant benet
is the reduction of the expected loss  p0 (xA) fu (rA)  u [rA   (1 + s) tEA]g for the agent.
The agents risk-aversion plays a decisive role in explaining the di¤erences between this
regime and the one considered in Section 2.1. If the principal could rely on a risk neutral agent,
even when the risk is fully transferred the optimal agents e¤ort would be described by (6), the
principal would choose the same evasion level as when she is liable, and the salary would di¤er
from the case of principals liability only by the amount of the expected loss.
2.3 Shared liability for sanctions
Let us come to the more realistic case in which the risk is never fully shifted onto the agent.
Now, in case of audit the principal has to pay the due tax and bears a share 0   < 1 of
sanctions, while the agent has to pay the remaining share 1   of sanctions.14
The principals problem then is:
max f[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   rg
s.t.

[1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1  ) stE]  g (x)  u0;
E  Y; x  0; r  0: (14)
Now it will be assumed that, for a given ,
[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   r > 0; (15)
so that once again the principal gets a positive return from tax evasion. Note that r  0
implies E > 0 as before. Moreover, 1   p (x) (1 + s) > 0 must hold as well. As a matter
14The case in which  = 1 implies full liability of the principal for both the due tax and the sanctions, and
coincides with the model studied in Section 2.1.
8
of fact, the latter inequality can be further specied so that it becomes clear that condition
(10) holds again. To see this note that, by applying the same reasoning as in Proposition 1,
it can be easily shown that the following condition necessarily holds in order to let the agent
participation constraint be satised:
r > p (x) (1  ) stE; (16)
which implies
[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE = [1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   p (x) (1  ) stE
> [1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   r
> 0;
so that once again (10) holds true, that is the agent must receive a salary larger than her
expected liability, while tax evasion must have an overall positive expected return.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption A.1 a solution (x; r

; E

) for problem (14) is completely
characterized by the following necessary K.T. conditions:
[1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1  ) stE]  g (x) = u0 (17)
 p0 (x) f(1 + s) tE [(1  p (x))u0 (r) + p (x)u0 (r   (1  ) stE)]
+u (r)  u [r   (1  ) stE]g = g0 (x) (18)
[1  p (x)]u0 (r)
p (x)u0 [r   (1  ) stE] 
(1  ) s
1  p (x) (1 + s)   1: (19)
The proof of Proposition 2 is based on standard tedious computations and thus it is omit-
ted.15
Condition (18) pertaining to e¤ort combines elements relevant for the principal the agents
marginal utility of income in the two states, that drives the monetary remuneration  and
elements relevant for the agent the di¤erence of the utilities in the two states of the world,
which provides the personal motivation for exerting e¤ort.
Like in the model discussed in the previous subsection, condition (19) pertaining to the
tax evasion amount holds as a strict inequality when the second constraint, E  Y in (14), is
binding, i.e., when E = Y .
Condition (19) di¤ers from its analogous, (13), that portrays the extreme case in which
the agent bears all the risk. One can still interpret tax evasion as a choice of the agent, since
the LHS in (19) has the standard form it takes in individual tax evasion problems, but one
must assume that the relative prices are distorted. That is, now the slope in absolute value of
the budget constraint facing the agent the RHS of (19) is lower because the agent is only
partially liable for sanctions and does not have to pay the tax on the evaded amount.16
Once more, the agents risk-aversion plays a decisive role in shaping the results. Under
agents risk neutrality a corner solution with full evasion  i.e., E = Y always arises since
15Note that the objective function in (14) is not concave and thus uniqueness of the solution (x; r

; E

)
characterized in Proposition 2 cannot in general be either guaranteed or ruled out. However, this does not
a¤ect our results specically, Propositions 3 and 4. See the discussion in Appendix 6.B.
16Even assuming a full shift of liability for sanctions onto the agent, when  = 0, condition (10) implies that
the RHS in (19) satises s= [1  p (x)]   1 < s. In other words, the absolute value of the slope of the agents
budget constraint is smaller than s, as tax evasion must have positive expected total rate of return.
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the LHS in (19) becomes [1  p (x)] =p (x) and it is straightforward to show that condition
(10) implies
1  p (x)
p (x)
>
(1  ) s
1  p (x) (1 + s)
  1 for all 0   < 1:
Moreover, condition (18) boils down to (6). Hence, with a risk neutral agent, the same tax
evasion and e¤ort would arise as in the case of principals liability, while the agents salary
would be larger by a share 1   of the expected amount of sanctions.
3 A comparison
Since under Assumption A.1  g0 (x) =p0 (x) is increasing in the e¤ort x, by considering the
extreme case presented in Subsection 2.2, in which the agent bears all the risk, an e¤ort smaller
than under the exclusive principals liability occurs if and only if
u (rA)  u [rA   t (1 + s)EA]  u0 (rP ) (1 + s) tY: (20)
Since in the LHS the choice is made by a risk-averse agent, while in the RHS by a risk neutral
one,17 the well-known problem of self-protection is at stake; that is, in general one cannot say
whether inequality (20) will be satised or not.18 Hence, the only possible hint is that, whenever
EA ! 0, then the LHS ! 0 as well and thus a smaller e¤ort will occur under agents liability.
One can thus guess that, as long as the agents risk-aversion induces the choice of a small tax
evasion level, at the limit this fact will also drive the e¤ort downwards. Similar e¤ects also arise
under shared liability. In this case the condition to check becomes:
(1 + s) tE f[1  p (x)]u0 (r) + p (x)u0 [r   (1  ) stE]g
+u (r)  u [r   (1  ) stE]  u0 (rP ) (1 + s) tY
where again the LHS ! 0 as long as a E ! 0. This fact suggests the idea that the evasion
level inuences the amount of e¤ort performed in the diverse liability regimes. In the following
subsections this idea is checked within a more general scenario; as a matter of fact, besides the
limit relationship between evasion level and e¤ort performed just considered, we shall establish
a su¢ cient condition linking the decrease of both the evasion level and e¤ort to the decrease of
the optimal remuneration.
3.1 E¤ects on the principals prot
In order to ease the comparison between the case in which only the principal is liable and all the
other cases, let us compare them under xed values of e¤ort, evasion and salary. The following
Lemma is required in the proof of next Proposition 3.
Lemma 1 Whenever
 
xA;; r

A;; E

A;

solves either problem (7) or problem (14), then it is
feasible for problem (3).
Proof. Let
' =

1 + s when the shift of risk is full (Subsection 2.2)
(1  ) s when the risk is shared (Subsection 2.3). (21)
17It has been shown before that when both parties are risk neutral the same e¤ort arises.
18See Privileggi et Al. (2001).
10
The point
 
xA;; r

A;; E

A;

satises the rst inequality in (3) the participation constraint 
as
u0 + g
 
xA;

=

1  p  xA;u  rA;+ p  xA;u  rA;   'tEA;
< u

rA;   p
 
xA;

'tEA;

< u
 
rA;

;
where strict concavity and strict monotonicity of u () establish the rst and the second in-
equalities respectively. Since all other inequalities in the constraint (3) are also satised by 
xA;; r

A;; E

A;

, the proof is complete.
The proof of Lemma 1 shows that when the same values for e¤ort, evasion and salary
solving the problem under agents liability are used when only the principal is liable, the agents
participation constraint relaxes, since the risk premium and the expected loss included in the
salary become redundant when the agent does not face any risk.
Proposition 3 If the liability regime changes from full liability of the principals to any other
regime of agents liability, then the principals prot becomes always strictly smaller.
Proof. Let
 
xA;; r

A;; E

A;

be the solution of either problem (7) or problem (14) for a given
0   < 1. Hence, by concavity of u () and either condition (11) or condition (17),
u

rA;   p
 
xA;

'tEA;

>

1  p  xA;u  rA;+ p  xA;u  rA;   'tEA;
= u0 + g
 
xA;

;
which is equivalent to
 rA; <  u 1

u0 + g
 
xA;
  p  xA;'tEA;; (22)
where u 1 () denotes the (strictly increasing and strictly convex) inverse function of u ().
Let
 (E; x) =

tE when the shift of risk is full (Subsection 2.2)
[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE when the risk is shared (Subsection 2.3), (23)
then the principals optimal prot when the agent is either fully or partially liable is given by
A; = 
 
EA;; x

A;
  rA;. Now,
A; = 
 
EA;; x

A;
  rA;
< 
 
EA;; x

A;
  u 1 u0 + g  xA;  p  xA;'tEA;
=

1  p  xA; (1 + s) tEA;   u 1 u0 + g  xA;
 max[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   u 1 [u0 + g (x)] : x; r; E satisfy (3)	
= [1  p (xP ) (1 + s)] tY   u 1 [u0 + g (xP )]
= [1  p (xP ) (1 + s)] tY   rP
= P ;
where in the second line we used inequality (22), in the third line the denitions of ' and  as in
(21) and (23) respectively, in the fourth line Lemma 1, in the fth line we labeled as (xP ; r

P ; Y )
the solution of the principals problem when she is fully liable characterized by conditions (4)
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to (6) while in the last but one equality we rearranged terms in (5) and calculated u 1 () of
both sides; nally we denoted by P the principals optimal prot when she is fully liable, and
the proof is complete.
Hence, it turns out that when all the risk is borne by the principal, her prot is always
larger, a result that extends that of Proposition 2 in Privileggi et Al. (2001) to the case of a
continuous wrongdoing. When liability is totally or partially shifted onto the agent her risk-
aversion works as a kind of restraint on the principal. If the impact of the liability shift is large
as a matter of fact, if no correction in the partiesbehavior occurs prots might even become
negative a reduction of tax evasion may become necessary. A lower tax evasion, however,
does not per se imply a larger expected tax revenue G(E; x), as the latter is given by:
G(E; x) = tY   tE [1  p(x)(1 + s)] ; (24)
specically, also expected sanctions must be accounted for. Thus, one cannot a priori exclude
that G(E; x) decreases even if there is more tax compliance, because the countervailing e¤ect
of an x increase might be stronger.
3.2 A simple test
Continuity of the possible evasion level implies that, when the liability is shifted from the
principal to the agent, the principal does not need to renounce tax evasion altogether, but
might nevertheless be forced to reduce it in order to avoid incurring a loss. This is because
the agent requests an increase in her compensation. In fact, the principals response to the
liability shift might imply such a bold cut in tax evasion that actually a reduction of the
agents compensation may ensue.
Proposition 4 If it is observed that rA;  rP , then both xA; < xP and EA; < EP = Y must
hold.
Proof. From the proof of proposition 3 we know that
rP = u
 1 [u0 + g (xP )] ; (25)
while from inequality (22) we have
rA; > u
 1 u0 + g  xA;+ p  xA;'tEA; > u 1 u0 + g  xA; : (26)
By using both (25) and (26) under the assumption rA;  rP we get
u 1

u0 + g
 
xA;

< u 1 [u0 + g (xP )] ;
which, since both u 1 () and g () are strictly increasing, immediately yields xA; < xP , and
the rst part of the Proposition is established.
To show that EA; < E

P = Y holds as well, we rst study the case in which the agent is only
partially liable. Let (x; r

; E

) denote the solution of problem (14) for a given 0   < 1. Since
 g0 (x) =p0 (x) is increasing in the e¤ort x, x < xP implies  g0 (x) =p0 (x) <  g0 (xP ) =p0 (xP ),
and thus conditions (6) and (18), in turn, imply
(1 + s) tY u0 (rP ) > (1 + s) tE

 f[1  p (x)]u0 (r) + p (x)u0 [r
  (1  ) stE]g+ u (r)  u [r   (1  ) stE] : (27)
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By strict concavity of u (), both
u0 [r   (1  ) stE] > u0 (r)
and (superdi¤erentiability property)
u (r)  u [r   (1  ) stE] > (1  ) stEu0 (r) ;
hold. Substituting the last two inequalities in (27) and rearranging terms yields
(1 + s) tY u0 (rP ) > (1 + s) tE

u
0 (r) + (1  ) stEu0 (r)
= (1 + s) tEu
0 (r)
 (1 + s) tEu0 (rP ) ;
where in the last inequality we used the assumption r  rP and again concavity of u ().
Simplifying common (positive) terms in both sides yields Y > E, as was to be shown.
To prove the case in which the agent is fully liable let (xA; r

A; E

A) be the solution of problem
(7) and observe that the analogous of inequality (27) when xA < x

P obtained through (6) and
(12) turns out to be simpler:
(1 + s) tY u0 (rP ) > u (r

A)  u [rA   (1 + s) tEA] ;
so that only the superdi¤erentiability property of u () is required to obtain the result by
following the same steps as above.
Proposition 4 provides the basics for running ex post tests aimed at assessing if a liability
shift was benecial from a social point of view. If a (weak) decrease in the gains of the agent
is observed, notwithstanding the fact that her legal risks have increased, one can infer that she
is risking less than beforehand and thus she must have a lower motivation for exerting e¤ort
to cover the evasion, which, in turn, is justied only if evasion has actually become smaller.
Hence there is an unequivocal signal of the success of the policy, since a decrease of both tax
evasion and e¤ort imply that Government revenue in (24) will increase. An increase in the
agents compensation, on the other hand, is not a signal in the opposite direction: simply one
cannot infer what is going on in terms of tax evasion and e¤ort without further information.
4 Examples and comparative statics
In view of Appendix 6.A, in order to build some tractable examples we shall use a CARA
negative exponential utility function of the form u (w) =  e w with (constant) absolute risk-
aversion coe¢ cient  > 0, as provided by (42) in Remark 2; note that u : R! ( 1; 0).
Similarly, the probability function will be of the hyperbolic type as in (38): p (x) = = (x+ 1),
with 0 <  < 1 and  > 0. To keep computations as simple as possible the e¤ort function
will be quadratic, g (x) = x2 with  > 0, as discussed in Remark 4. Whenever parameter 
is chosen su¢ ciently large so that condition (47) holds, i.e.,   2= [2 (1  )], Proposition 6
guarantees that all the constraints in the maximization problems described in Subsections 2.1
to 2.3 are convex. While when only the principal or only the agent is fully liable (Subsections
2.1 and 2.2) the objective functions in the principals maximization problems are concave, in
all other scenarios characterized by di¤erent degrees of liability borne by the agent, 0 <  < 1,
(quasi)concavity of the objective function in (14) jointly in the three variables x, r and E cannot
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be guaranteed (see, e.g., Sévi and Yal, 2005, and the literature quoted therein). Hence,
uniqueness of the optimal solution (x; r

; E

) cannot in general be assured.
19 However, we
have been successful in establishing uniqueness of the solution for the models specication just
described; details are reported in Appendix 6.C.
4.1 Numeric examples
We shall x all the parameters values except for the sanction rate s and the coe¢ cient of
absolute risk-aversion . Specically, Y = 100, u0 =  0:9, t = 0:4,  = 0:1 and  = 1, while
the e¤ort parameter  will be kept at its minimum compatible with concavity of all problems
considered, that is, condition (47) will be binding:  = 2= [2 (1  )] = 1= (1:8) ' 0:556 (see
Example 1). For the model in which liability for sanctions is shared (Subsection 2.3) the case
in which  = 0:5 will be considered.
We shall investigate how the optimal solutions (x; r; E) characterized by the K.T. condi-
tions described in Subsections 2.1 to 2.3, together with the principals net benet , change for
di¤erent values of the absolute risk-aversion coe¢ cient  and the sanction rate s. The results,
as discussed in Appendix 6.C, are computed with the support of Maple 13. Table 1 reports the
results for s = 2:1 while either  = 10 or  = 0:5. Table 2 reports the results for s = 1 while
again either  = 10 or  = 0:5.
Risk-aversion
coe¢ cient
Principal fully
liable
Agent fully
liable
Shared liabi-
lity:  = 0:5
 = 10
xP = 1:233
rP = 0:290
EP = 100
P = 34:158
xA = 0:175
rA = 0:043
EA = 0:132
A = 0:010
x = 0:562
r = 0:201
E = 1:012
 = 0:150
 = 0:5
xP = 0:839
rP = 1:352
EP = 100
P = 31:906
xA = 0:175
rA = 0:850
EA = 2:635
A = 0:204
x = 0:562
r = 4:026
E = 20:237
 = 3:007
Table 1: optimal solutions and principals net benet when the sanction rate is s = 2:1 in the
three regimes when the principal is fully liable, denoted by (xP ; r

P ; E

P ; P ), when the agent is,
denoted by (xA; r

A; E

A; A), and when sanctions are equally shared between the principal and the
agent, denoted by (x; r

; E

; ) for risk-aversion coe¢ cients  = 10 and  = 0:5.
Note that when the agent is liable and the solutions are interior  i.e., both 0 < EA < 0
and 0 < E < Y hold, the optimal e¤orts x

A and x

 turn out to be independent of the absolute
risk-aversion coe¢ cient , as explained at the end of Appendix 6.C. Intuition on this purpose
suggests the following explanation: since with CARA the desired amount of tax evasion does
not depend on income, the latter can always be adjusted to accommodate the preferred e¤ort
while also securing the reservation utility. Hence the salary rA; and the evasion E

A; change
in response to changes in risk aversion, while e¤ort does not. This property does not hold for
corner solutions, i.e., when EA = E

 = Y .
Numerical examples conrm that a liability shift from the principal onto the agent can
actually entail a reduction of the agents remuneration, which in turn implies that both evasion
and e¤ort are smaller. This e¤ect is more likely at high sanction and/or high risk aversion
19See Appendix 6.B for a discussion.
14
Risk-aversion
coe¢ cient
Principal fully
liable
Agent fully
liable
Shared liabi-
lity:  = 0:5
 = 10
xP = 1:213
rP = 0:249
EP = 100
P = 36:136
xA = 0:277
rA = 0:077
EA = 0:308
A = 0:047
x = 1:198
r = 19:918
E = 100
 = 17:352
 = 0:5
xP = 0:729
rP = 1:005
EP = 100
P = 34:367
xA = 0:277
rA = 1:531
EA = 6:163
A = 0:935
x = 0:774
r = 15:384
E = 100
 = 21:234
Table 2: optimal solutions and principals net benet when the sanction rate is s = 1 in the three
regimes again for risk-aversion coe¢ cients  = 10 and  = 0:5.
levels. The relevant sanction severity depends on both the rate s and the amount of risk shifted
upon the agent. On the other hand, an increase in the agents compensation may entail either
a decrease in e¤ort and evasion, as in the second column of the second row in table 2, or an
increase in e¤ort, as in the case of full evasion (corner solution) reported in column three of
the second row of Table 2. The latter case is more likely when the sanction is lower and/or the
agent is less risk-averse.
An interesting feature of the framework under consideration, characterized by an agent with
a CARA utility function, is that when the agent is partially or fully liable e¤ort does not
depend on the tax rate t, while it is increasing in t when the principal is.20 This property
suggests that a shift of liability onto the agent increases the degrees of freedom of the tax
policy, since even if the tax rate is increased there is no danger of inducing a larger e¤ort in
covering up tax evasion.
4.2 Comparative statics analysis
We end this Section with some comparative statics analysis specic to the regime in which the
agent is fully liable and when the optimal solution is interior so that 0 < EA < Y .
Proposition 5 Consider the regime in which the agent is fully liable for the functional forms
u (w) =  e w, p (x) = = (x+ 1) and g (x) = x2 chosen in this section such that all
parameters Y , u0, t, , , ,  and s satisfy Assumption A.1 plus condition (47) in Appendix
6.A. If the optimal solution (xA; r

A; E

A) to problem (7) is interior in the sense that 0 < E

A < Y ,
then the optimal e¤ort in concealing misdemeanor, xA, is decreasing in the sanction rate s:
@xA
@s
< 0:
Moreover, the optimal evasion EA turns out to be decreasing in both the sanction rate s and
the tax rate t:
@EA
@s
< 0 and
@EA
@t
< 0:
20After substituting the exponential terms from the second equations in systems (51) and (52) in Appendix
6.C, the single equations in x thus obtained do not depend on t, while, by means of the implicit function
theorem, it is easily seen that the optimal e¤ort in equation (50) is increasing in t.
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The proof is reported at the end of Appendix 6.C.
For corner solutions of the type EA = Y it is readily seen that the signs of @x

A=@s and
@xA=@t depend on the magnitude of x

A, and thus a clear-cut comparative statics result cannot
be provided.
Summing up, with reference to internal solutions our results conrm the predictions of the
standard individuals tax evasion model when a risk-averse agent is considered. This is in line
with the fact, already noted in Subsection 2.2, that when all the risk is shifted onto the agent
her optimal choices coincide with those that would arise if the activity was soldto the agent
and the surplus extracted by the principal through a lump-sum fee.
While the computations needed for performing a comparative static analysis for the shared
liability case are excessively demanding, one expects that similar results would arise, since also
in that case one can interpret the result as a decision about tax evasion taken by an agent (see
Subsection 2.3). Since, however, the slope of the budget constraint faced by the agent would
be smaller in absolute value, the size of the reaction to the parameterschanges is likely to be
smaller than in the case in which the whole risk is transferred onto the agent.
5 Conclusion
Tax evasion by rms is a very complicated phenomenon that can be understood only by trac-
ing back its roots to the rms internal organization, which describes how the responsibilities
and the incentives are allocated and how they interact in producing the rms behavior. The
principal-agent model o¤ers a natural framework for studying this problem. It also represents
a very exible framework, in which di¤erent scenarios can be studied, according to the assump-
tions made about the partiesattitudes toward risk, the information they possess, and the type
of activity that the agent is expected to do within the rm.
In this paper we have studied the case in which the cooperation of a risk-averse agent (such
as an employee or a consultant) is needed in order to evade taxes. Moreover, the agent can
exert e¤ort in order to reduce the ensuing risk. In this framework policies aimed at curbing tax
evasion can target either the principal or the agent or both of them.
The immediate policy aspects of this paper are as follows. When liability is shifted from
the principal to the agent, a problem of excessive loyalty might arise, and the agent might
be pushed to help the principal in concealing tax evasion. However, we are also able to show
that there are win-win scenarios, in which both tax evasion and e¤ort in covering decrease. A
tough enforcement policy and a high agents risk-aversion render these scenarios more likely.
An indicator that the win-win case has arisen is a decrease in the agents remuneration. Thus,
a signal of success of policies that crack on tax o¢ cers, consultants and tax preparers, in order
to moralize their conduct and to curb tax evasion, would be a shrinking of their remunerations
and income share, ceteris paribus. Indirect signals might be represented by the shrinking of the
share of the population involved in activities pertaining to tax preparation and in the share of
students demanding education in this eld, of course once again controlling for other possible
explanatory factors.
One might in principle also consider going the other way round, i.e., setting caps on the
compensations for assistance to the taxpayers, in order to discourage risky cooperation with
evaders. However, since the ceilings should not fall short of the remuneration level adequate for
legally permissible assistance, the information needed to design them seem beyond the reach
of the regulator. What is sometimes done,21 and might be advisable to do to a larger extent, is
21In USA under Code Sec. 6694 a tax preparer who prepares a tax return or claim for refund with an
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setting penalties as an increasing function of the gatekeepers illegitimate gains, in order to cap
at least the expected benets that gatekeepers receive if they contribute to illegal activities.
6 Appendix
6.A Conditions for constraints convexity
We aim at establishing su¢ cient conditions under which the rst inequalities in the constraints
(7) and (14) dene a convex set in R3+. Specically, we shall provide conditions under which
the following function,
v (x; r; E) = [1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u (r   E)  g (x) ; (28)
where the constant  is dened as
 =

(1 + s) t when the shift of risk is full (Subsection 2.2)
(1  ) st when the risk is shared (Subsection 2.3),
turns out to be quasiconcave in x, r and E, so that its upper contours are convex sets.
Lemma 2 If, under Assumption A.1, the following conditions hold:
i)
p (x) p00 (x)  2 [p0 (x)]2 for all x  0 and
ii)
  u
00 (w)
[u0 (w)]2
 [p
0 (x)]2
[g00 (x) p (x)  2g0 (x) p0 (x)] p (x) [1  p (x)] for all w > 0 and x  0;
then v (x; r; E) in (28) is quasiconcave, and thus its upper contours are convex sets.
Proof. To prove quasiconcavity of v (x; r; E) we directly tackle the upper contour sets:
(x; r; E) 2 R3+ : v (x; r; E)  
	
; (29)
and show that under Assumption A.1 plus conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 2 they are convex
sets for all  2 R.
The sets (29) are equivalently dened as the sets of points (x; r; E) satisfying
E  G (x; r) ;
where
G (x; r) =
r

  1

u 1

  [1  p (x)]u (r) + g (x)
p (x)

(30)
is a function of the only two variables x and r for each given , in which u 1 () denotes the
inverse of the utility u (w). Note that the set (29) corresponds to the hypograph of the function
G in (30); therefore, the sets (29) are convex if and only if the hypographs of the functions
Gs are convex sets for any  2 R. Moreover, it is well known that a function has convex
understatement of liability due to a unreasonable positionmight be subject to a penalty equal to or larger
than 50% of the income derived from the tax return preparation.
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hypograph if and only if it is a concave function; hence, our plan is to show that G (x; r) is a
concave function in its two variables x and r.
Note that, since u 1 () is strictly increasing and strictly convex, G (x; r) in (30) is the
sum of a linear function, r=, and the opposite of a strictly increasing and strictly convex
transformation of the function
L (x; r) =
  [1  p (x)]u (r) + g (x)
p (x)
=
  u (r) + g (x)
p (x)
+ u (r) : (31)
Thus, in order to establish concavity of G (x; r) in (30), it is su¢ cient to show that L (x; r) in
(31) is convex in x and r. To achieve such goal we study the Hessian matrix of L (x; r), whose
partial, second-order derivatives are:
Lxx =
g00 (x) p (x)  2g0 (x) p0 (x)  [  u (r) + g (x)]
(
p00 (x)  2[p
0 (x)]2
p (x)
)
[p (x)]2
; (32)
Lrr =  1  p (x)
p (x)
u00 (r) ; (33)
Lxr =
p0 (x)
[p (x)]2
u0 (r) : (34)
Since, by Assumption A.1 (i) and (ii), Lrr in (33) is clearly positive, we must show that both
Lxx in (32) and the determinant of the Hessian matrix, LxxLrr   (Lxr)2, are non-negative.
By Assumption A.1, the rst two terms on the numerator of the RHS in (32) are both
positive; moreover, by denition of upper contour set in (29) the following holds:
  [1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u (r   E)  g (x)
= u (r)  p (x) [u (r)  u (r   E)]  g (x)
 u (r)  g (x) ;
where the last inequality holds as p (x) [u (r)  u (r   E)]  0. Therefore [  u (r) + g (x)] 
0 in the last term on the numerator of the RHS in (32); moreover, by condition (i), the last
factor,

p00 (x)  2 [p0 (x)]2 =p (x)	, is non-negative, thus establishing that Lxx > 0.
Since the last term on the numerator of the RHS in (32) is non-negative, condition (ii) is
su¢ cient for the determinant of the Hessian matrix, LxxLrr   (Lxr)2, with Lxx, Lrr and Lxr
given by (32), (33) and (34) respectively, to be non-negative, and the proof is complete.
Condition (ii) in Lemma 2 can be rewritten in a clearer way by separating properties related
to each function u (w), p (x) and g (x), as the next Proposition shows.
Proposition 6 Let B = infw0
 u00 (w) = [u0 (w)]2	 and assume that B > 0. Then, a su¢ -
cient condition for (ii) in Lemma 2 is the following:
 p
0 (x)
p (x)
 B [1  p (0)]
(
g0 (x) +
s
[g0 (x)]2 +
g00 (x)
B [1  p (0)]
)
for all x > 0: (35)
Proof. By using the denition of B, condition (ii) in Lemma 2 can be rewritten as
p0 (x)
p (x)
2
 B [1  p (x)]

g00 (x)  2g0 (x) p
0 (x)
p (x)

: (36)
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Since p (x) is a decreasing function of x, a su¢ cient condition for (36) is
p0 (x)
p (x)
2
 B [1  p (0)]

g00 (x)  2g0 (x) p
0 (x)
p (x)

;
which is equivalent to
p0 (x)
p (x)
2
+ 2B [1  p (0)] g0 (x)

p0 (x)
p (x)

 B [1  p (0)] g00 (x)  0:
Let  =  p0 (x) =p (x), so that the last inequality can be rewritten as
 2   2B [1  p (0)] g0 (x)   B [1  p (0)] g00 (x)  0; (37)
where, for xed x, the LHS represents an upward parabola in  with roots given by
 = B [1  p (0)]
(
g0 (x)
s
[g0 (x)]2 +
g00 (x)
B [1  p (0)]
)
:
Since, by Assumption A.1 (iii), g00 (x)  0, one root is non-positive and thus it must be ruled out
[recall that, by Assumption A.1 (ii),  =  p0 (x) =p (x) > 0 must hold]; therefore the solution
of (37) is
  B [1  p (0)]
(
g0 (x) +
s
[g0 (x)]2 +
g00 (x)
B [1  p (0)]
)
;
which is (35).
Condition (35) states that the rate of decrease of the probability p (x) must be bounded
from above by a term involving the rst and second derivatives of u (w) and g (x). The most
striking feature of inequality (35) is that it provides the bound on  p0 (x) =p (x) which involves
only the function p (x) entirely in terms of properties of g (x).
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Lemma 2 as well as (35) in Proposition 6 may appear a bit abstract
at a rst sight. As a matter of fact, the family of functions u (w), p (x) and g (x) satisfying
such conditions, besides being nonempty, includes some meaningful cases.
Specically, condition (i) is satised (with equality) by the following family of hyperbolic
probability functions:
p (x) =

x+ 1
(38)
for parameters  and  such that 0 <  < 1 and  > 0, as can be easily checked. Moreover,
condition (35) is satised by all HARA utilities of the form
u (w) =

1  

 +


w
1 
; (39)
with  > 0,  > 0, and satisfying   1, and by the set of exponential e¤ort functions of the
type22
g (x) = 
 
ex   x  1 ; (40)
with  > 0 and  > 0, provided that some conditions involving all parameters , , , ,  and
 are met, as stated in the next Proposition.
22Note that the e¤ort function in (40) satises Assumption A.1 (iii) and (iv) for all  > 0 and  > 0.
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Proposition 7 Assume that utility is of the family (39), probability is of the type (38) and the
e¤ort function is given by (40). Then condition (35) in Proposition 6 holds whenever
p
1    
p
 1: (41)
Proof. From (39) it is immediately seen that  u00 (w) = [u0 (w)]2 = [ + (=)w] 1, and thus,
since   1, B = minw0 [ + (=)w] 1 =  1 > 0. From (38) we have p (0) =  and
 p0 (x) =p (x) = = (x+ 1)   p0 (0) =p (0) = , so that an upper bound for the LHS of (35)
is ; while from (40) we get g0 (x) = 
 
ex   1  g0 (0) = 0 and g00 (x) = 2ex  g00 (0) =
2, so that a lower bound for the RHS of (35) is
 1 (1  )
s
2
 1 (1  ) = 
p
(1  )  1:
Rearranging terms in   p(1  )  1 condition (41) is obtained.
Remark 1 Condition (41) does not depend on parameter  in (39).
Remark 2 For 1   < +1 and  > 0 HARA utilities dened in (39) exhibit decreasing
absolute risk-aversion but increasing relative risk-aversion. However, for large w the relative
risk-aversion of all utilities in (39) tend to become constant, approaching the value  from below.
Moreover, if  = 1, for  ! +1 (39) becomes the CARA negative exponentialutility:
u (w) =  e w; (42)
where  > 0 is the (constant) coe¢ cient of absolute risk-aversion. Note that, by Remark 1, in
this case condition (41) is independent of the absolute risk-aversion.
Finally, note that by applying lHôpitals rule to the equivalent version of (39) given by
u (w) =

1  
"
 +


w
1 
  1
#
;
for  ! 1 we obtain log utility:
u (w) = ln ( + w) ; (43)
and the lower bound B in (35) boils down to B = 1, as in this case  u00 (w) = [u0 (w)]2  1 for
all w  0.
Remark 3 Letting  = 0 in (43) we obtain
u (w) = ln (w) ; (44)
which exhibits constant relative risk-aversion equals to 1. As for the general log utility dened
in (43), the lower bound B in (35) for u (w) dened in (44) equals 1, and thus condition (41)
in Proposition 7 becomes
p
1    
p
; (45)
for both the constant relative risk-aversion utility dened in (44) and the increasing relative risk-
aversion utility dened in (43). It turns out that (44) is the only member of the CRRA utility
functions family that, when associated with probabilities dened as in (38) and e¤ort functions
dened as in (40), is capable of providing a su¢ cient condition for the function v (x; r; E) in
(28) to be quasiconcave along the arguments developed in this appendix, i.e., whenever (45) is
satised.
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As the LHS is increasing in both  and , the likelihood of holding condition (41) increases
for smaller  and ; hence, Proposition 7 states that, for any choice of parameters   1,  > 0
(or  = 1 if  = 0),  > 0,  > 0 and  > 0, all related to the functions u (w) and g (x),
there always exist a probability function p (x) of the type (38), with parameters  and/or 
su¢ ciently small, that renders the function v (x; r; E) in (28) quasiconcave. For xed , smaller
s let the graph of p (x) to be lower and atter, while, for xed , smaller s let the graph of
p (x) to be higher and less convex.
When  =  = 1 [a situation encompassing all CARA utilities of the type (42), as claried
in Remark 2] condition (41) boils down to
p
1    : (46)
Inequality (46) says that the e¤ort in concealing misdemeanor may cost less i.e., smaller  in
(40) when the probability of detection is either uniformly smaller i.e.,  in (38) is smaller
or it decreases more rapidly i.e.,  in (38) is smaller.
Remark 4 Condition (35) in Proposition 6 actually holds also for one single power e¤ort
function, the quadratic function g (x) = x2, with  > 0. In this case a lower bound for the
square root in the RHS of (35) is given by g00 (x)  2, so that, by keeping the probability and
the utility functions as in (38) and (39) respectively, if  = 1 (or  = 0 and  = 1) our condition
becomes
2
2 (1  )  ; (47)
which looks similar to (46), and hence the same comments apply with reference to parameter 
in place of  as a measure of e¤ort cost.
Example 1 If we take any log utility, either with increasing relative risk-aversion as in (43)
or of the CRRA type as in (44), or any CARA utility as in (42), and a probability function
given by (38) with  = 0:1 and  = 1, then, by condition (46), an e¤ort function as in (40)
with  = 1 must have a parameter  not smaller than 1=
p
0:9 ' 1:054, while by condition (47)
a quadratic e¤ort function of the type g (x) = x2 requires its parameter  to be not smaller
than 1= (1:8) ' 0:556.
6.B On uniqueness of the solution when liability is shared
Uniqueness of the optimal solution (x; r

; E

) in problem (14) of Subsection 2.3 cannot in
general be guaranteed, as the three variables x, r and E appear both as a product and as
a sum in the objective function, which thus, in general, turns out to be neither concave nor
quasiconcave. However, in this appendix we briey argue why it seems not unreasonable to
expect problem (14) to be actually concave. We shall see in Appendix 6.C that this is the case
for the numeric examples discussed in Section 4.
The function v (x; r; E) dened in (28) is di¤erentiable and strictly increasing in r, i.e.,
(@=@r) v (x; r; E) > 0 for all feasible x; r; E; thus, by the implicit function theorem, the contour
set v (x; r; E) =  coincides with the graph of a function of the only two variables x and E,
r (x;E). As the participation constraint in problem (14) is binding, after setting  = u0 the
function ru0 (x;E) can be substituted in the objective function and the whole problem simplies
to
max f (x;E) = [1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   ru0 (x;E)g (48)
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over the (convex) rectangle f(x;E) : x  0; 0  E  Y g.
Under the assumptions of Lemma 2 the upper contour set

(x; r; E) 2 R3+ : v (x; r; E)  u0
	
is a convex set. Because (@=@r) v (x; r; E) > 0, such contour set corresponds to the epigraph of
function ru0 (x;E);23 therefore, ru0 (x;E) is a C2 convex function, that is, its Hessian matrix
has second-order partial derivatives such that ru0xx  0, ru0EE  0 and ru0xxru0EE (ru0xE)2  0. Hence,
the second-order partial derivatives in the Hessian matrix, H, of function  (x;E) in (48) are:
xx =  pxx (1 + s) tE   ru0xx < 0;
EE =  ru0EE  0;
xE =  px (1 + s) t  ru0xE:
While the signs of xx and EE are clearly negative and nonpositive respectively, the sign of xE
depends on the cross-e¤ect of e¤ort and evasion on the agents compensation. The determinant
of H is
(1 + s) tEpxxr
u0
EE + r
u0
xxr
u0
EE   [(1 + s) tpx]2   (ru0xE)2   2 [(1 + s) tpxru0xE] : (49)
The rst term in (49) is nonnegative, while, by convexity of ru0 (x;E), the sum of the second
and fourth terms is nonnegative as well, ru0xxr
u0
EE   (ru0xE)2  0. Hence, the sign of (49) can be
positive if ru0 (x;E) is strictly convex, j(1 + s) tpxj is not too large, and either ru0xE  0 or
j2 [(1 + s) tpxru0xE]j is not too large when ru0xE < 0. Therefore, when ru0 (x;E) is strictly convex
and the probability function p (x) is su¢ ciently at and/or the cross-e¤ect between e¤ort and
evasion is not too large, the Hessian matrix, H, turns out to be positive denite, establishing
concavity of function  (x;E) in (48), so that problem (14) has a unique solution (x; r

; E

)
fully characterized by conditions (17) to (19) of Proposition 2.
Note that at any rate the concavity of the whole problem and the uniqueness of the solution
(x; r

; E

) is not needed in both Propositions 3 and 4, where the unique solution (x

P ; r

P ; Y )
under principals full liability is compared to any solution
 
xA;; r

A;; E

A;

under di¤erent
liability regimes either shared or fully borne by the agent.
6.C Building the examples of Section 4
For the functionsspecication chosen in Section 4 conditions (5) and (6) for the case in which
the principal is fully liable become8<:
 e r = x2 + u0

(x+ 1)2
(1 + s) tY =
2x
e r
;
which, after substituting the common term e r, boils down to the following cubic equation in
the only variable x:
2
 (1 + s) tY
x (x+ 1)2 + x2 + u0 = 0; (50)
which, in turn, is easily solved through Maple 13 yielding a unique positive value24 xP ; r

P is
then immediately calculated.
23ru0 (x;E) represents the minimum compensation needed for satisfying the agents participation constraint.
24The Maple 13 code for the solutions in all three liability scenarios is available from the authors upon request.
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Similarly, when the agent bears all the risks conditions (11) to (13) can be written as8>>>><>>>>:
  e
 r
x+ 1

x+ 1   + e(1+s)tE = x2 + u0
  e
 r
x+ 1

e(1+s)tE   1 =   2

x (x+ 1)
e(1+s)tE  (x+ 1  ) =s;
which, again, by substituting the common terms  e r= (x+ 1) in the rst two equations,
boils down to the following system in the only two variables x and E:(
 (x2 + u0)

e(1+s)tE   1+ 2x (x+ 1) x+ 1   + e(1+s)tE = 0
e(1+s)tE  (x+ 1  ) =s; (51)
where, as before, the rst equation is cubic in x, even after substituting from the last one. Such
system can either have a unique interior solution when 0 < EA < Y and the last inequality
holds with equality which is obtained by substituting e(1+s)tE in the rst equation from the
second one and then solved through Maple 13 with respect to x, or a unique corner solution 
when EA = Y and the last inequality is strict which is again computed by solving the rst
equation through Maple 13 in x for E = Y .
Finally, when liability for sanctions is shared between the principal and the agent conditions
(17) to (19) can be reduced to8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
  e
 r
x+ 1

x+ 1   + e(1 )stE = x2 + u0
  e
 r
x+ 1

(1 + s) tE
x+ 1   + e(1 )stE
x+ 1
+ e(1 )stE   1

=   2

x (x+ 1)
e(1 )stE  (x+ 1  ) [x+ 1   (1 + s)]
 [(1  ) s  1] (x+ 1) + 2 (1 + s) ;
which, as before, by substituting the common terms  e r= (x+ 1) in the rst two equations,
boils down to the following system in the only two variables x and E:8>>><>>>:

2x (x+ 1)2 +  (x2 + u0) (1 + s) tE
 
x+ 1   + e(1 )stE
+ (x2 + u0) (x+ 1)

e(1 )stE   1 = 0
e(1 )stE  (x+ 1  ) [x+ 1   (1 + s)]
 [(1  ) s  1] (x+ 1) + 2 (1 + s) :
(52)
When 0 < E < Y and the last inequality holds with equality we can substitute from the
second equation both terms e(1 )stE and E dened by
E =
1
 (1  ) st ln

(x+ 1  ) [x+ 1   (1 + s)]
 [(1  ) s  1] (x+ 1) + 2 (1 + s)

(53)
(which is the second equation suitably rewritten) in the rst equation and then solve through
Maple 13 with respect to x; in this case, however, we need to rely on the Maples numeric
procedure fsolve, rather than on the symbolic one solve, which works well in the former
cases. After substituting e(1 )stE and E from the second equation, uniqueness of the solution
just found can be checked through graphic inspection by plotting the LHS of the rst equation
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in (52) as a function of x: it is clearly seen that such function intersects the horizontal axis
only at one point.25 To make our uniqueness test more robust we also checked that the second
order condition holds on the unique point found.26 Again, a unique corner solution when
E = Y and the last inequality is strict, so that the objective function becomes concave in the
two variables x and r is computed by solving the rst equation through Maple 13 (by means
of solve) in x for E = Y .
Note that when the solutions are interior, i.e., both 0 < EA < 0 and 0 < E

 < Y hold,
after substituting for the exponential terms e(1+s)tE in systems (51) and e(1 )stE as well as
for E given by (53) in system (52), the optimal e¤orts xA and x

 turn out to be independent
of the absolute risk-aversion coe¢ cient , as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Of course, this property
does not hold for corner solutions, i.e., when EA = E

 = Y .
Proof of Proposition 5. Assume that 0 < EA < Y . Then, after substituting the second
equation in system (51) and rearranging terms we get the following unique equation in x:

 
x2 + u0

[x+ 1   (1 + s)] + 2x (x+ 1) (x+ 1  ) (1 + s) = 0:
By labelling the LHS as f (x; s) and di¤erentiating it with respect to x and s respectively we
get:
@f
@x
= 2
 
x2 + u0

+ 2 [x (x+ 1) + (3x+ 1) (x+ 1  ) (1 + s)] ;
@f
@s
=    x2 + u0+ 2x (x+ 1) (x+ 1  ) :
Since Assumption A.1(iv) requires u0  u (0) =  1, while (47) in Appendix 6.A states that
  2= [2 (1  )], the following holds:
@f
@x
 2

2
2 (1  )x
2   1

+ 2
2
2 (1  ) [x (x+ 1) + (3x+ 1) (x+ 1  ) (1 + s)]
>  2 + 2 (1 + s)
= 2s
> 0;
25Details and plots are available from the authors upon request. Note that, in order to check unique-
ness of the zero for the LHS of the rst equation in (52) as a function of the only variable x, we need
to bound the range for such variable to some interval [0; xU ]. A useful upper bound xU can be calculated
using the monotonicity of the probability p (x) and the participation constraint in (14), obtaining g (x) 
[1  p (0)]u (r)   u0; then, under condition (15), from the objective function get r < [1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE <
tE  tY , so that x < g 1 f[1  p (0)]u (tY )  u0g. Under our models specication this condition becomes
x <
pf[1  p (0)]u (tY )  u0g =; however, as the term [1  p (0)]u (tY ) turns out to be negligible under our
parametersvalues, we set the upper bound xU =
p u0=.
26As a matter of fact, we followed the approach outlined in Appendix 6.B and substituted the participa-
tion constraint, rewritten as ru0 (x;E) = (1=) ln
nh
p (x)

1  ee(1 )stE

  1
i
=

u0 + x
2
o
, into the objective
function as in (48); then we checked graphically that the objective function  (x;E) is concave jointly in x and
E over the rectangle [0; xU ] [0; Y ], with xU dened in footnote 25. Moreover, we also plotted the determinant
(49) of its Hessian matrix as a function of x and E to check that it is positive on the whole feasible set, so that
the Hessian turns out to be everywhere denite negative. Details are available upon request.
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where the second inequality uses the fact that x > 0. As for @f=@s,
@f
@s
=  x2   u0 + 2x (x+ 1) (x+ 1  )
> x [2 (x+ 1) (x+ 1  )  x]
= x f[2x+ 1 + 3 (1  )] x+ 2 (1  )g
> 0;
where the rst inequality holds since u0 < 0, while the last inequality holds as x > 0 and the
term in curly brackets is clearly positive. Therefore, by the implicit function theorem @xA=@s =
  (@f=@s) (xA; s) = (@f=@x) (xA; s) < 0 and the rst statement is established.
By rewriting the second inequality in system (51) which holds as equality as
E =
1
 (1 + s) t
ln

x+ 1  
s

and di¤erentiating the RHS with respect to s and t respectively we get:
@E
@s
=   1
 (1 + s) t

1
1 + s
ln

x+ 1  
s

   (@x) = (@s)
x+ 1   +
1
s

;
@E
@t
=   1
 (1 + s) t2
ln

x+ 1  
s

:
Since from the rst part of the proof we know that at the optimum (@x) = (@s) < 0, a su¢ cient
condition for (@E) = (@s) to be negative is
x+ 1  
s
> 1 for all x > 0;
which is equivalent to (10) for p (x) as in (38). Clearly, the same condition is su¢ cient for
(@E) = (@t) < 0 as well, and the proof is complete.
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